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Summary findings
If states would interact more synergistically with  Local bureaucratic reform, combined with more
communities, they could tap local energies and resonrces  egalitarian community social organizations, allows the
for development-and  help create a development-  creation of powerful coalitions and synergies for rapid,
oriented society and polity in the process.  self-sustaining development. This model has been used to
Das Gupta, Grandvoinnet, and Romani analyze  achieve outcomes ranging from better health care and
experience in several countries to identify the actions  drought relief to the generation of agrarian and
required for state-community synergies in development.  industrial economic growth. In China and Taiwan,
Two actions that seem especially important:  China, these state-community synergies  helped produce
* Broadening the distribution of power within  not only for local consumption but for a rich export
communities, to facilitate collective action and reduce the  market.
potential for local capture. In rural areas, much can be  The cases show that with creative political thinking it
done by expanding access to credit, strengthening  is possible to effect rapid change even in poor
tenants'  rights, and expanding non-crop sources of  institutional settings. The Brazilian experience shows
income.  how difficult institutional change is in highly
a  Creating  state-community alliances to improve the  inegalitarian settings, but also how such obstacles can be
effectiveness of local public sector institutions and the  overcome by changes designed to bring grassroots
delivery of services.  Case studies from East Asia and Latin  electoral pressure to bear on local government.
America show that such alliances can effect rapid  Experience elsewhere shows, however, how fragile such
improvements in local institutions, benefiting not only  efforts can be if political support from above is
communities but also politicians seeking support and  prematurely withdrawn.
legitimacy.
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A major development challenge facing us today is How can poor developing countries
change paths  to  make  institutional settings  more conducive to  growth  and poverty
reduction? Experience and research have shown that the nature of formal and informal
institutions go far towards shaping countries' development paths.'  Much work is being
done  to  illuminate  how  different  types  of  political  regimes  and  administrative
organisation affect development outcomes. 2 However, these studies tend to focus more
on the comparative dynamics of these systems, and less on the more challenging question
of the feasibility of moving from dysfunctional institutional settings to those with greater
development effectiveness. Within these larger discussions, we focus on the subset of
issues related to getting effective delivery of public goods at the community level, and
specifically on the problem of shifting from one path to another.
With  growing  awareness of the  limitations of  traditional "top-down"  approaches for
development and poverty reduction, interest has shifted to the potentially powerful role of
the participation of communities in the planning and management of public sector service
delivery at the local  level.  To use the potential of  local communities effectively  for
development,  we  need  to  understand  the  dynamics  of  communities  and  of  local
administrations,  and  their  interaction with  higher levels  of  administration.  A  better
understanding of what constrains these actors in  developmental action is  essential for
building a more synergistic relationship between the state and society.
Communities  are  characterised  by  a  dense  network  of  multi-stranded  relationships,
which  can  be  both  powerful  allies  or  obstacles  to  development.  Involving  local
communities in the development process has several advantages. Local information can
be  put  to  good  use  in  many  ways  for  planning,  implementing and  monitoring  of
programmes.'  The efficiency of many development actions is enhanced in small-scale
communities, whose members not only have a direct knowledge of the situation, but also
have  a  direct  stake  in  the  outcomes,  despite  probable  asymmetries  of  information
between members. As illustrated by many studies, local monitoring can be very effective
at ensuring accountability in use of funds, and performance of services. 4 Sanctions for
offences are hard to ignore when they come from people with whom one necessarily has
multi-stranded and longstanding relationships.
And yet many communities are characterised by serious power imbalances, which place
severe constraints on community-based development. Where vertical links between local
elites and the poor are strong, it is difficult to form the horizontal associations necessary
for organising collective action for the common good. Moreover, there is real danger of
"local  capture"  of  development  programmes.  In  such  settings,  higher  levels  of
government  may  actually  be  better-motivated  to  help  the  disadvantaged  than  local
agencies influenced by local vested interests. For example, the federal government in the
United  States has a  long history  of protecting minority  civil  rights better  than  state
governments  (Foner  1989).5  This  may  be  because  of  ideological  reasons,  various
political and electoral motives, or merely because the centre is detached from specific
local power relationships.
1To make the most of the potential advantages of local public services delivery, it is also
important to  change the mode of operation  of local government agencies so that they
draw  on  local  information  and  monitoring  capacity.  In  many  settings,  local
administrations are designed to be "instruments of the central government in change of
controlling local resources, and orietnted  to law and order". 6 Not only do they have little
accountability to the people they serve, but often the system is specifically designed to
minimise interchange between communities and local administration, in order to reduce
opportunities for corruption.
We argue that reducing socio-political hierarchies through land reform and expanding
non-crop  sources of  income help create more egalitarian communities.  This frees  up
individuals  and  groups  within  the  communities  to  initiate  actions  for  their  own
development. It also prepares communities as a whole for collective action that may be
used for the common good, as well as for collaborating with government agencies and
monitoring their performance.
We also  argue that higher levels  of the  state can catalyse local  administrations into
improving  their  development  effectiveness  and  working  collaboratively  with
communities.  By  forming  alliances  with  communities  to  demand  and  monitor
performance, higher levels of government can improve development outcomes while also
gaining legitimacy and popular support. Drawing on some successful country examples,
and  abstracting from  their individual historical trajectories, we  illustrate how quickly
such institutional changes can be wrought. These changes can be powerful in releasing
local energies for development: catalysing local initiatives and freeing people to engage
in a range of activities to improve their economic and political conditions.
I  The Community: mitigating socio-political hierarchies
As many anthropological and economic studies show, strong socio-economic hierarchies
seriously  undermine  the potential  for collective action  for the  common  good  within
communities, and increase the potential for local elite capture of benefits destined for the
community. Societies with considerable income and asset inequalities are characterised
by sharp conflicts of interest between groups. Quantitative analyses find that collective
action works better among people who are relatively equal and have similar needs and
resources.7
This is  contrary to  Olson's  (1971) view that inequalities are beneficial  for collective
action. There is of course considerable scope for collective action for the common good if
a local boss so decrees: a common feature of hierarchical agrarian settings was that the
local  landlord  would  get poor  community  members to  contribute  free  labour  for  a
common project. However, this is not conducive to the horizontal associations necessary
for engaging community energies in planning and monitoring development activities and
generating a civil society (Putnam 1993).
More moderate degrees of socio-economic differentiation are less inimical to collective
action. Relatively mild differentiation can actually be helpful by allowing scope for local
leadership, as indicated in studies reviewed by Baland and Platteau (l999).8  We describe
2here how the dynamics of more substantial inequalities within communities can hinder
collective action. The discussion pertains essentially to settled agrarian societies, such as
those in Asia, Latin America and peasant Europe.
Patron-client relationships as constraints on collective action:
Patron-client relationships are a familiar feature of many agrarian societies. They are a
subset  of  the  "interlinked  contracts"  analysed  by  development  economists:  where
contractual relationships have multiple roles, with the terms of one transaction contingent
upon the terms of another. The classic example of this  is the patronage  relationship
between landlords and tenants, where a single contract has intertwined within it tei=ancy
and credit arrangements. For example in West Bengal India, Bardhan and Rudra (1981)
found a high proportion of labourers borrowed from landowners in the slack season with
the commitment to supply labour services in the peak season. The number of labour days
needed to repay the loans is usually computed at a per diem which is significantly lower
than the rate prevailing at the time of the "subscription" of the loan. Since landlords have
much better  ability to  access credit  markets than  labourers, they  have  a  monopoly
position as financial intermediary between an outside loan market and his labourers.
Using  the  analytical tools  of methodological individualism, development economists
have explored how different levels of risk-aversion are exploited in an unequal exchange
relationship. In agrarian contexts, work on landlord-tenant "labour-tying contracts" has
shown how richer, less risk-averse people can prey on the insecurity of the poor. 9 Taking
advantage of the fact that security is the greatest need of the poor, they offer security in
exchange  for  considerable  amounts  of  foregone  income  and  loss  of  freedom  and
autonomy. Thus in Bardhan and Rudra's (1986) study area, many people would not go to
work in a neighbouring village despite higher wage rates, because they did not want to
risk breaking their ties with their patron.
Over time, social norms emerge from repeated games between contracting parties. As
anthropologists and historians have observed, that these agrarian relationships generate
not  only  rules of behaviour but  also crystallise a moral universe characterised by  an
unequal  distribution  of  socio-political power.  This  moral  universe  in  which  people
operate  goes far  beyond  the  immediate dynamics of  "labour-tying"  contracts  to  the
fonnation of class interests.
Patron-client relationships are most obvious when landownership is strongly polarised,
with a few large landowners maintaining ties with a large number of tenants or labourers.
Examples of this abound in Latin America and Asia, as well as in pre-industrial Europe.
Yet these relationships can be just  as strong where large landholdings are absent, but
where those who dominate the land market act as a class group vis-A-vis  the rest of their
community. Examples of this abound, for example, in India, where a classic feature of
rural social organisation has been jajmani  relations, whereby landowners (small or large)
operate with a clear and strong group interest, and are the patrons of the landless.10
The  critical  feature  of  these  patron-client  relationships  is  that  they  make  for  a
concentration of power in a community, creating sharp divisions amongst the members of
a  community. The crux of the matter is summarised in Breman's  (see Breman  1974)
3succinct phrase "patronage  and exploitation": flipsides of the same logic of exercising
one's power as a landlord. Landlords have a strong interest in keeping others in a position
of  vulnerable dependence  for  economic gain  as well  as  enhanced  social  status.  By
offering  the poor  credit  and  some  measure of  generalised insurance  against  serious
contingencies, landlords are able to obtain labour at low rates and charge high interest
rates on their capital. The insurance offered is highly elastic, offering greater support
when times are very bad and less when they are better. For the patron, such noblesse
oblige ensures their clients' continued survival and participation in the relationship.
Another key commodity that patrons offer their clients is negotiating on their behalf with
the outside world, in the absence of well-functioning market and non-market institutions.
The patrons  are  not  only  the  source  of  credit,  insurance and  employment,  but  also
monopolise sources of information and contacts. They are the indispensable conduit for
negotiating all manner of issues. If a client's  child is sick, the patron has the transport and
the social contacts with the good doctors. If they need to deal with local authorities and
government agencies, the patron has the access to the necessary knowledge and assets.
Not  surprisingly,  the  patrons  expect  to  be  the  prime  beneficiaries  of  any  new
opportunities made available in the outside world, including development programmes.
This goes far towards shaping the mindsets of the clients in ways which constrain their
potential mobility. It is abundantly clear to them that their safest strategy is to maintain
good relations with their patron, and never to challenge him. Moreover, their ability to
assess the costs and benefits of alternate courses of action is blurred by the fact that they
are  offered  generalised  insurance,  so  they  do  not  have  to  fully  intemalise  the
consequences of their own decisions. Sharp constraints on mobility and aspirations add to
their sense of limited ability to  improve their  lives through their  own actions. When
patron-client ties dissolve, some important constraints on mobility are lifted, along with
the generalised insurance: creating both the possibility and the incentive to try to improve
one's own situation (Das Gupta 1999).
In addition to the substantial economic gains of "patronage", there are equally compelling
gains in terms of status and prestige. In peasant societies, land is much more than a factor
of production: it is a source of power, status and authority. Having others dependent on
one's beneficence is one of the major ways of manifesting this status. Thus patrons seek
to circumscribe individual mobility among their clients, using if necessary the threat of
withdrawing insurance and even physical force.
The calculus of status is powerful. Rural elites scuttle development programmes not only
because they want to embezzle the funds, but also to make sure that their underlings do
not obtain opportunities for upward mobility.  1 If they permit a school to function, they
will try to make sure that it functions only for people of their own class. Many of the
"landlords"  in Bihar own so little land that they would normally be classified as small
cultivators, but  they  have  a  strong  sense of  class  hegemony  and  apparently do  not
perceive alternative sources of status. This pushes them to expend their energies in class
warfare against the lower castes instead of encouraging local development.
Unless patrons  can perceive  serious alternative sources of prestige  (such  as  through
becoming successful in the modem economy, as in the Indian states of West Bengal and
Kerala),  these  social  considerations  can  outweigh the  possible  economic  gains  of
4permitting  greater social mobility. For example, the landlord described in Appendix  1
might  well gain financially if he  were to join the middle peasants in their strategy of
maximising crop incomes, but for him it is far more important to ensure that others do not
challenge his socio-political hegemony.
Such rigid socio-political hierarchies not only place crippling constraints on  individual
action, but also on collective action for the common good. If the distribution of power is
too skewed in a community, the prospects of trust and co-operation are low. The elites
will perceive collective action by the poor as a threat to their hegemony, and will strongly
discourage it. For their part, the poor are unlikely to want to engage in collective action
for fear that the elites will seek retribution or appropriate the gains.
In such contexts, the scope for changing social patterns is narrow. When people within a
community fight to defend group interests, not merely individual economic interests, it
becomes  difficult  for them  to  organise for  collective action  on  behalf  of  the  whole
community.  Ethnographies abound  in  examples of  fights  over  symbols of  status  and
power, and not merely the substance of their immediate economic gains and losses.  In
fact, people will make considerable economic sacrifice in the short run to preserve their
long-run class/caste status. For example in a village  in North India,
the local government  decided  to divide  the village common  lands into small plots to be
granted  to some landless people.  Although  the plots were so small as to present little
economic  threat to the landowning  caste, the very idea of giving others the status of
owning land was enough to galvanise  people  of this caste-class  to action. At their own
expense,  they came from a radius of hundreds  of miles, people of different religions,
and supported  a political protest over years to prevent  this action. They courted arrest,
they tied up their tractors for transport  and went to all manner  of lengths  to prevent  this
trivial distribution  of common  land in one village.  Fortunately,  the landless  were able to
obtain the support of the police and the press to back up the efforts of the local
government  (Das Gupta 1982).
In that case, state intervention was key to success. The fact that this is class warfare rather
than simply individual clashes makes it easier for the state to intervene. A couple of other
examples  from  India  illustrate  how  effective  this  can  be  in  changing  centuries-old
patterns of  discrimination.  Across  South India,  a  common way  of keeping  the  client
classes in their place was to deny them access to temples on the basis of their caste. Since
1950, successive administrations were successful in changing this,  using the threat  of
police  action  effectively  to  ensure  that  temple  entry  could  not  be  denied  (Srinivas
1966).12  This kind of actions are not possible when the state administration continues to
be dominated by the interests of the rural elites.
Much of the above discussion has been based on South Asian examples, but there is a
rich  literature  on  Latin  American  countries,  detailing  even  more  extreme  agrarian
inequities based on concentration of landownership.  The distribution of landownership
has  historically  been highly  unequal  across much of  Latin  America,  and  patterns  of
patronage and labour-tying are common. (Thiesenhusen 1995b). For example, under the
hacienda  system  of Mexico, a  whole  community of peasants lived  and worked  on a
landlord's property under a system of patron-client relations:
5The hacienda  is not just an agricultural  property  owned  by an individual.  It is a
society  under  private auspices.  It is an entire social system  and it governs  the life
of those attached  to it from the cradle  to the grave  (Tannenbaum  1962).
Also common is use of violence to keep labour in their place and to resist their acquiring
land (Hall 1994). In many Latin American settings, the landowner-politician nexus was
successful in resisting reforms or in initiating counter-reforms, and thereby defending
their status.13 For example, the militaxy regime following the assassination of Allende in
Chile took measures to reverse land reforms (Thiesenhusen 1995b.). More recently in
Brazil, efforts to distribute land to the land-poor were undermined by powerful lobbies,
such that in the new settlements in Amrazonia  6% of the landowners own 80% of the farm
land (Prosterman et al. 1996).
Since the economic insecurity of the poor is primarily what  enables their patrons  to
maintain a stranglehold over them, much can be done to alleviate this situation through
land reform and diversification into non-crop sources of income.
The role of land reform:
Mitigating these socio-political hierarchies opens up the possibility of effective collective
action  within  a  community. By  releasing  people's  energies to  engage  in  their  own
development, land reform can have enormous indirect impact on growth and poverty
alleviation.
This can be more important than the direct equity and efficiency gains of land reform on
which studies of land reform are typically focussed, and for which the empirical evidence
is somewhat mixed. In some settings land reform has been carried out carefully enough to
be  effective in promoting equity and  reducing poverty. Elsewhere, landowning elites
have been successful in resisting it through active links with political elites  and other
evasion tactics. 14 Even where land has actually been redistributed, it can benefit mostly
the upper echelons of the rural poor, increasing the gap between them and the poorest.
Some studies have found strong evidence of productivity gains associated with giving
sharecroppers and small farmers more secure rights over the land they cultivate. This was
found  in analyses of data from Tunisia (Laffont and Matoussi  1995), Ghana (Besley
1995) and China (Lin 1992).  In West Bengal state of India, increasing tenants'  rights
was associated with 17-18% average productivity gains (Banerjee et al 1998). In another
study in India, Binswanger et al. (1993) concluded that small farms are more productive
in settings with little mechanisation arid slow technical change. Other studies, however,
have found inconclusive evidence of productivity gains (Besley and Burgess 1998).
Apart from productivity gains, strengthening tenants'  rights can help make local social
and  political  relationships more egalitarian. Without undertaking the politically  more
challenging  task  of  altering  legal  ownership  of  land,  this  seeks  to  strengthen  the
bargaining position of tenants vis-a-vis their landlords. It gives tenants greater security of
tenure,  and  often also  specifies lower ceilings on  rents charged. As  studies  in West
Bengal and elsewhere indicate, even this limited change requires considerable political
commitment on the part of the state, to overcome landlord resistance as well as tenants'
fears of retribution from landlords. 16 Tenants need to be thoroughly persuaded that they
6will not be net losers from participating in this reform process: that the reforms will not
be reversed, and also that the gains will offset the potential loss of support from their
landlords. The state has to be  very vigilant to  enforce tenancy reforms,  as in  Kohli's
description of West Bengal (1987:127-131):
In a local struggle  involving  inherently  unequal  social actors,  sustained  external  support
on the side of the underdog was essential to modify the power balance...  .The local
police have moreover been instructed  by the government  at minimum  to refrain from
taking sides with the landlords and, at maximum, to  provide the bargadars with
protection in conflicts over crop-sharing  and disputes over evictions. Wherever the
landlords have hired their own "thugs" to  settle conflicts by  force, the party has
attempted  to counter  by militant  mobilization.
The role of non-crop sources of income:
Given  that large proportions  of the rural poor in developing  countries are landless or
nearly landless --- and that per capita land availability is rapidly diminishing  in poorer
regions of the world --- it is important to look beyond land reform for ways to make the
rural poor less dependent on patrons. Key to this is creating more diversified sources of
rural  income less  dependant on  owning land, such as livestock  rearing  and non-crop
activities.  These  are  also  politically  much  less  challenging  than  land  reform.
Disseminating information on such opportunities, providing access to necessary resources
and marketing can all help greatly in helping the poor diversify and increase their sources
of income (Appendix 2). Help is required with obtaining credit, finding the appropriate
inputs, acquiring know-how about production and marketing, ensuring quality control,
and reaching wider  markets. The poor have especial need of these services, as richer
households are better placed to access them on their own.
Expanding the profitability of raising livestock helps the poor acquire productive agrarian
resources even if they have little or no land. Keeping livestock offers a way of moving up
the  economic ladder:  a  landless household  can begin by  "sharecropping"  a  calf,  and
gradually save enough to afford more expensive and remunerative livestock (Appendix
2). This has been successful in many contexts. Through a creative model of dairy co-
operatives,  the National  Dairy Project  in India has  helped to  significantly  raise rural
household incomes, including those of the landless, marginal and small farmers. 17 This
has  included  a  range  of  services, such  as  giving  grants  of  cattle  to  the  very  poor,
providing virtually free artificial insemination to improve cattle breeds, and establishing
milk collection centres where milk quality is assessed and people are paid on the spot.
Non-crop activities include those related to agricultural production (e.g. repairing  tools
and  food-processing),  but  even  more  important  from  the  point  of  view  of  risk-
diversification are those not related to agriculture. This can range from self-employment
in  micro-enterprises  to  larger  scale  enterprises  which  hire  in  labour.  The  scope  for
increasing incomes and diversifying risk increases greatly with  improved transportation
and  encouragement  of  greater  geographical spread  of  industrial  enterprises,  enabling
people living in rural areas to commute to non-farm jobs  as is common in  China and
India. This also increases their access to information and personal networks, and their
exposure to new opportunities.
7There is a great deal of evidence that non-crop incomes alleviate poverty in developing
countries  while  contributing to  growth.'8 By  diversifying income  sources,  non-crop
income helps reduce risk, enabling households to take the risks involved in activities with
higher returns. As incomes rise in the rural areas, demand grows for all kinds of services
and capital becomes available for broadening the range of production. These forward
linkages, which further raise income  and employment opportunities, are noted in studies
across Africa and Asia.1 9 The effect on income equity is more mixed: many studies find
that they increase income equity, while others find that the rich gain proportionately more
than the poor. 20
However, it needs to be borne in mind that in some settings the main  source of growth of
non-agricultural sectors is the agricultural sector, which link these alternatives sources of
income to the primary sector. They rely more heavily on outside sources of services and
infrastructure. They may also create environmental problems, and be  less productive.
Expanding non-crop sources of income also increases the scope for mobility out of the
village, draining the community of some of its most dynamic members. However, in
contexts  where  land  reform  is  politically  infeasible,  it  is  rational  to  foster  those
alternatives sources of income through provision of  services and infrastructure.
Releasing energies  for development al the community level
Land  reform  and  increasing  non-crop  opportunities  have  considerable potential  to
diversify socio-political hierarchies and enable greater mobility in a  community as a
whole.  Since  income  shocks  in  the  agrarian  and  non-agrarian  sectors  are  often
uncorrelated, non-crop incomes also reduce dependence on patrons for help with tiding
over income shocks. Technical and practical measures such as disseminating information
on tubewells or establishing milk collection depots thus help propel communities towards
a more developmentally-oriented polity. Not surprisingly, rural elites try to scuttle such
programmes  (Appendix  1). Describing the  resistance  of  local  elites  to  their  credit
programme, a worker in a Bangladesh Rural Action Committee (BRAC) centre said:
Trhe  moneylenders  tried many  tactics.  They  threatened  their clients  never to help them again if
they came to us. It was only  with a lot of persuasion  and reassurance  that our program would
remain  in place  for a long  time,  that we could  make  headway  with  these  poor families...
Even if the direct beneficiaries of the land reformn  do not include the poorest, they can
benefit enormously indirectly from the social churning generated in the community. The
newly-mobile peasants may raise wage  rates (Appendix  1); they  may take  on  more
remunerative opportunities and free up attractive niches for the landless (Appendix 2);
they may hire labour for new crop and non-crop enterprises or house construction. They
will also be able to provide some credit and sources of insurance for the poorer, reducing
larger landowners' monopoly of these spheres.
The  newly  mobile  peasants  may  seek  greater  accountability  in  the  use  of  local
development funds and lobby to ensure that the community receives functioning schools,
roads,  bus  services, clinics  and  other entitlements. They are  better placed  to  access
information and networks, for which earlier the landlords were the indispensable conduit.
The community is  better  placed to  provide the peer-evaluation and  peer-monitoring
required for key facilities such as crecdit  co-operatives. In a multiplicity of ways, land
8reform and non-crop  incomes help reduce dependence on  landlords as a  conduit for
credit, insurance, employment, information and access to services: reducing the need for
the poor to accept low wages, labour-tying contracts, and low aspirations in exchange for
their patrons' help.
These changes also help the poorest. They are more likely to be able to access education
and information, and obtain loans without tugging their forelocks and mortgaging future
generations of labour. Instead of being systematically prevented from aspiring to upward
mobility, they are offered new role models and opportunities. Even when the  newly
mobile peasants struggle to dissociate themselves from the poorest community members
to reassert their newly acquired status, these  changes  in the  environment in which the
poor function make it easier for them to emerge out of poverty. The broader institutional
possibilities enabled by more egalitarian social organisation are discussed in the next
section.
Taiwan and South Korea are powerful examples of how reducing agrarian hierarchies can
release  energies  for development. They had  almost ideal  conditions for  radical  land
reform after the Second World War. Firstly, the departing Japanese colonialists left large
tracts of land vacant, available for the initial postwar round of land reform. Secondly, the
threat  of Communist revolution provided a spur to  land reform as  a bulwark against
Communism. The third factor facilitating the reform was that the new regimes owed little
to  pre-existing landowning elites.  Taiwan came to be ruled by the Kuomintang  from
mainland China, with little need for support from local elites. In South Korea, the new
political  leadership was relatively unencumbered by existing political links, as it took
root in the vacuum left by Japan and the chaos of the Korean War. Moreover, the Korean
landowning class was deeply discredited by their perceived collaboration with Japanese
colonists.  With  active  support  from  the  United  States,  both  countries  designed
imaginative and successful land reforms.
Land  reforms  facilitated the  growth of  horizontal developmental associations within
South  Korean  and  Taiwanese  communities.  As  mentioned  above,  Whang  (1981)
emphasises that the potential for South Korea's rapid rural development was generated by
the land reforms, enhanced further by equal access to primary schooling. Making social
relations  within the  community more egalitarian was an essential  precondition to  the
imaginative use  of local communities in monitoring local irrigation officials in  South
Korea  and  Taiwan  (Wade  1997), discussed  below.  A  similar  shift  in  the  political
economy  of  community  relationships  following land  reform  is  well-documented  in
Taiwan's  cooperative movement. Cooperatives were established  in Taiwan  under the
Japanese,  but  they  blossomed  after  the  land  reforms  into  much  more  active
developmental  organisations.  With  government  support,  farmers'  organisations
flourished, helping peasants to pool  their savings, improve irrigation and  obtain new
technologies, and over time develop rural industry (Ranis and Stewart 1993).
Broader ramifications for  the polity
The most important gain of land reform is that it lays the basis for more inclusionary and
developmental polity.  As  Harriss  (1999) points  out,  the  regions  of  India  in  which
traditional  agrarian  power  structures  have  been  changed  show  better  development
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many positive changes, and helped low-caste people feel that local  government is no
longer "captured" by the local elites.2'  By contrast in Uttar Pradesh, local elites buttress
their power by appropriating public funds for recruiting and rewarding supporters and
"Human development and social inequality did not figure as important political concerns
at all" (Dreze and Gazdar 1996).
Discussing the impact of land reform in South Korea, Whang (1981:97-98) argues that
the gains of land reform were strictly socio-political:
(Land  reform) helped to miniaturize  farm size ... and in so doing helped the delay of
agricultural modernization in terms of productivity  and mechanization.... (But it)
promoted  egalitarianism  in rural communities...  and thus facilitated  the disappearance
of class consciousness  between  landlords  and tenants.... Thus  the land reform  provided
the social and psychological  precondition  necessary  for co-operation  among framers
and that in turn prepared  the way for the rural innovation  that was later ignited by the
Saemaul Undong.
These shifts can be  powerful  and long-lasting, even with  relatively meagre  levels of
redistribution. Studies of the Southern United States show that despite the very limited
and truncated efforts at giving land to Blacks during the 1  870s:
... well into the twentieth  century,  blacks  who did acquire land were more likely
to register, vote and run for office than other members  of the rural community
(Foner 1989:109,  cited in Herring 1999).
Again  in  the  1930s,  landless black  tenants  who  benefited  from  very  limited  land
distribution created "...a  permanent middle class that ultimately emerged in the 1960s as
the backbone of the civil-rights moverment  in the rural South" (Salamon 1979:129, cited
in Herring 1999).
II  The State: creating synergies between local administrations and communities
The modem state has enormous potential for providing the institutional support, inputs
and infrastructure necessary for upward mobility and for triggering  local development
initiatives. This requires careful design of bureaucratic organisations and staff incentives
for  performnance:  a  large question that  has received considerable attention. 22 It  also
requires care to avoid "local capture", which is an especial obstacle to development in
settings characterised by wider  socio-economic inequalities (Bardhan and Mookherjee
1999).
Several analyses  show  how  service  delivery  improves if  the  highly  complementary
strengths of communities and the state apparatus are blended: using local strengths in
information and monitoring  capacity to  complement technical  and  other inputs  from
higher levels of government. 23 For example, the successful South Korean canal irrigation
system described below  had high  levels of government draw up the  broad  irrigation
policy, put technical experts in charge of canal construction, and had routine operation
and maintenance carried out by people with strong stakes in the end-user community.
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who form the  direct interface between communities and the  state. Here,  too,  creative
mixing  of  local  and  supra-local  strengths  can  be  highly  productive.  In  settings
characterised by wide socio-economic inequalities, the risk of "local capture" is high. In
such cases, it is possible to form effective alliances between  higher levels of government
and communities  to  elicit better  service delivery  from local  agencies  (Figure  1), and
develop  tight  links  between  local  administrations  and  communities.  We  begin  by
illustrating some key obstacles to performance by grassroots level staff and how they can
be averted, drawing on Wade's  (1982,  1997) comparison of South Korean  and Indian
irrigation agencies. This is followed by description and analysis of country case studies of
successful redesign of local agency incentives.
The importance of agency incentives and design: illustrations from  Indian and South
Korean canal irrigation systems
The Indian system  is carefully designed to  minimise the  scope for  collusion between
irrigation staff and the farmers who are their end-users. The canal patroller must be a full-
time employee and cannot farm more than a marginal amount of land. He must not be
posted  in  the jurisdiction  in  which his native  village is  located, and must  be  rotated
between posts within six years. He is recruited by the irrigation department, and after a
probationary period his post in made permanent. His salary derives from the departmental
budget.
The  work  of  Indian  canal  staff  is  hampered  by  an  elaborate  system  of  checks  and
balances which  separate  control of  funds from  those  who need to  expend them.  For
example, if the canal develops a significant breach and labour needs to be hired to repair
it,  neither  the  foreman  nor  the  assistant  engineer  is  authorised  to  undertake  the
expenditure  without  the  permission  of  the  executive  engineer,  who  is  often  not
contactable at short notice. As a result "most assistant engineers are inclined to play it
safe,  allowing the  breach to  deteriorate  until they  can contact their  superior"  (Wade
1997:124).  Designed to  bar corruption, these mechanisms have the resulting  effect of
discouraging initiative, and are counter-productive.
Distanced from their clients and hampered from effective performance, the Indian canal
patrollers have little positive reinforcement from client feedback or their own sense of job
satisfaction. Meanwhile, their bureaucratic  superiors have their own problems to  deal
with. Inadequately protected from political pressures, they are faced with arbitrary and
unwelcome  transfers  if  they  displease their political  bosses.  As  Wade  (1985) puts  it
"Frequently,  the  pressures  on  officials  to  be  corrupt  cause them  to  behave  in  ways
contrary to the ostensible objectives of their departments". These concerns also reduce
their  responsiveness to  requests  or alerts  from their junior  staff,  further reducing the
latter's incentive to perform.
By contrast, local management of the South Korean canal irrigation system is carried out
by associations with strong links to the state as well as the end-user communities. Staff
salaries and their operational budget derive partly from the water charges collected. In
most  associations,  the  president  is  an  appointed  representative  of the  national  level
Agriculture Ministry. The professional staff must belong to the same county as the end-
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the communities they serve. The patrollers, whose job it is to control the water flow and
to  do  small-scale  maintenance,  are  selected  by  the  chiefs  of  the  villages  in  their
jurisdiction and must be re-nominated by them each year. When necessary, patrollers can
draw on the technical and other support of the large organisational structure above them.
There are thus multiple incentives for a South Korean canal patroller to perform well,
which do not apply to his Indian couiterparts. He has an interest in obtaining irrigation
water  himself, in  avoiding sanctions from  his  own community, and  in  ensuring his
continued employment. Not subject to transfer, he and his colleagues in the irrigation
department are also able to develop strong working relationships and exert peer pressure
on  each  other.  An  Indian  canal  patroller has  little  incentive to  perform  and  little
opportunity to develop the good working relationships necessary for good performance.
His incentives are furthered reduced by a virtual absence of promotion opportunities,
even though he is expected to spend his life as a full-time employee of the department.
These two case studies demonstrate tlhe need to consider the impact of different sets of
incentives and  organisations in  different  contexts. Well-designed incentives may not
work at the implementation stage, if they are not in tune with a particular context, and if
external  agents - higher level  administrations, end-users-- are not  made  part  of the
organizational framework.
Some case studies of successful re-organisation of local administrative agencies
In  very  different  political  and  administrative  settings,  innovative  institutional  re-
organisation has fostered state-community alliances for development and helped avert
"local capture" of development programmes. Encouragingly, these case studies show that
such institutional change can be achieved quite rapidly, given strong political will. For
example, the above description might suggest that South Korean local government had a
long history of good development outreach. Yet the basic structure that Wade describes
was put into place in the early 1960s, less than two decades before his study.
Altering the organisation and values of local administrative institutions in South  Korea
required considerable creative organisaLtion  on the part of the state:
Historically,  local governments  in  Korea have been instruments  of  the central
government  in charge  of controlling,  local resources,  and oriented  to law and order.
Support  of rural development  for rneeting  development  needs of rural communities
seemed  to be a new  concept  to them...  .The  organisation  of local  governments  has been
restructured  so as to introduce  a functional  transformnation  from  control  and regulation  to
development  support  administration.  (  Whang  1981:17).
In  the  1970s, the  South  Korean government  also  undertook  a  programme  of  rapid
community development, the Saemaul Undong (Whang 1981, Wade 1982). The idea was
to  galvanise  communities  into  upgrading  their  own  living  conditions,  while  also
incorporating them  into the central structure of  the state. Through  wide  information-
dissemination and  propaganda about the programme, people were informed about the
benefits of the programme and encouraged to support it. This was combined at the local
level  with  more  direct  exhortation  and  some  coercion,  reinforced  by  organised
competition whereby more successful communities were  rewarded by being allocated
more  resources  by  the  state.  Community  leaders  were  trained  and  local  officials
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encouraged  to  interact  in  many  fora  with  higher  officials,  such  that  they  could
spontaneously develop new ideas and avenues of co-operation:
...  the organisational  channels  provided  for Saemaul leaders  greatly  encouraged  the
participation  of village  leadership  in the  decision-making  processes  both  at the township
and county  levels.  Indeed,  a few  Saemaul  leaders  worked  as members  with  the Saemaul
Consultation  Committee  at both  township  and  county  levels...  .(They  were  also)  given  the
privilege  to freely  meet with the county-chief  or governor  if they wanted  to do so.
(Whang  1981:  96).
The  results  were  to  improve  villages  along  a  wide  range  of  dimensions.  Village
infrastructure was extensively constructed and upgraded: including roads, water systems,
bridges,  small-scale  irrigation,  and  electrification.  A  variety  of  income-generating
projects and savings programs were  initiated. Community and domestic hygiene were
greatly improved through various measures, such as better cattle housing and improved
water  management.  Moreover,  the  costs  were  borne  largely  by  the  communities
themselves: the response was so enthusiastic that communities contributed around 70%
of the total resources required for these projects (Whang 1981:15).
Clearly a community development initiative trying to upgrade living conditions required
the  active participation  of  women.  In  a  sharp  break  from  traditional  constraints  to
women's  participation  in  public  life,  this  was  encouraged  (Whang  1981:106-110).
Women were obliged to participate with men in the village general assembly. The women
responded with alacrity to this new opportunity, becoming a driving force of change:
The members  of Saemaul Women's Association  initiated  a campaign  for burning up
the cards with which their husbands gambled during the off-season. (They) also
organized a campaign for closing down the liquor stores within their villages where
their husbands used to drink and thus add more hardship to their pains of poverty-
stricken  housekeeping.
The women's  associations undertook many activities to  improve their  families'  lives.
They operated a small savings project which evolved into a "mothers' bank" with a small
revolving credit union. Income-generating activities included running village cooperative
stores and collecting waste for sale. Through a village kitchen project,  they organised
collective  cooking  in  the  busy  season,  and  also  taught  ways  of  improving  family
nutrition.
This  model  of  developing  a  dense  network  of  ties  between  communities  and  local
administrations also underlies the stunning growth of township and village enterprises
(TVEs) in China during the 1980s and 1990s. 24 For various reasons, including a desire
to reduce rural-urban migration, the central government took steps to favour industrial
development  in  rural  areas,  by  allowing  local  communities  to  organise  their  own
enterprises. Community leaders are elected by the community, but are affirmed by higher
authorities and function as members both of the state administrative hierarchies as well as
of  their  own villages.  Through  their ties  with the  administration, community  leaders
obtain information on economic opportunities as well as help with accessing the credit
and other resources for realising these opportunities.
The...  difference between governments of township and villages and governments
above  township level is that most officials of township  and village governments  are at
the same time members  of collective  organisations,  and are, therefore, also owners of
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members both of China's administrative  hierarchy and of their own villages. (Pei
1996:45-61)
Collective action is greatly facilitated in Chinese communities by tightly-knit kinship ties
and local loyalties, within which framework people are accustomed to co-operating for
mutual benefit. 25 Community sanctions are used effectively in this system:
The characteristics  of local governments  are also rooted in the organization  of China's
rural communities....because  of the low information  costs of the social group and the
geographic immobility of village officials, the cost  of choosing and the  cost  of
evaluating  performance  are very low. The official  cannot make a continued  return for
himself  alone ... Should  he try to do so, his highly  valued  reputation  and its interrelated
benefits  will be lost. So it is the official's  own long-term  interest  not tojeopardize  them.
(Pei 1996:  45-61)
The potential for using these longstanding social institutions could, however,  only be
realised  after  crucial  changes  in  financial  incentives.  Before  the  market  reforms,
communities had little incentive to  increase output, as the state would appropriate the
surplus. The system of taxation now varies between settings, but a common practice is for
taxes  to  be fixed in  advance  (Qian and  Weingast  1996). Any income  beyond  that is
shared by the  community and officials, giving both a big  stake in the success  of the
enterprise. At the same time, the state does not provide bailouts: the community faces
hard budget constraints and if they cannot make the enterprise work successfully, they
stand to  bear the full loss. Their continued reliance on agriculture helps  cushion them
against industrial setbacks, as well as providing a source of capital for investment.
In Taiwan, efforts to build active collaboration between the state and communities helped
to simultaneously develop agriculture and rural industry. Following land reform, and with
the  need  for  fast  and  strong  development  successes,  the  Taiwanese  government
stimulated rural communities to rapidly develop its agrarian economy. This is succinctly
described in Fei, Ranis and Kuo (1979:37-71):
The farmers' associations  and credit cooperatives,  set up by the Japanese to facilitate
agricultural extension programs and rice procurement, were top-down institutions
dominated by landlords and nonfarrners.  As a result, most farmers did not directly
benefit from them. In 1952 government  consolidated  those institutions  in multipurpose
farmers' associations  restricted  to farmers  and serving their interests.  In addition to the
original function of  agricultural extension, the activities of  farmers' associations
expanded  to include a credit department,  which accepted deposits from farmers and
made loans to them, and to provide facilities for purchasing,  marketing,  warehousing,
and  processing. The  associations thus became clearinghouses for  farmers, who
controlled  and maintained  them and v  iewed  them as their own  creatures.
With skilful adaptation, these associations were also used to engender rapid growth of
industrial production based in rural areas (Fei et al. 1981). Nor was this constrained by
the  relatively  small  volume  of  internal demand  for  industrial  goods:  the  state  made
available  the  necessary  information and  other  organisational  support  to  enable  rural
industry to produce for the international market.
In  Ceara, northeast Brazil,  Tendler  (]L997)  describes how  the state tried to  overcome
problems in service delivery by forming an alliance with local workers and communities.
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their performance in areas such as public health, agricultural extension, drought relief and
building infrastructure such as schools. The state recruited and trained a fresh cadre of
grassroots workers to provide these services, and motivated them highly by publicising
their work and offering much official recognition for their services:
Simply  by virtue of working in these programs,  they were told, they stood above the
rest as leaders,  and this placed a special  burden on them to behave  responsibly.  All this
contributed  to a new respect for these workers  by the public --- remarkable  in a time of
widespread  contempt  for government.  (Tendler 1997:136).
A publicity blitz served as a multi-pronged weapon in this strategy. It helped reinforce
respect for the workers. At the same time, it encouraged people to have high expectations
of the programme and hold workers accountable for their performance. It also informed
people  of  what  services  they  should  receive,  so  that  they  could  pressurise  local
government  to  provide  them  if  the  services  were  not  forthcoming.  This  publicity
campaign helped galvanise  communities into collective action, with  technical  support
where necessary:
...the school maintenance  and repair program  drew neighborhood  associations  into the
process of selecting  small contractors.  And to enable these associations  to informally
monitor  the repair and reconstruction  work, agency  technicians  instructed  them in some
basic procedures  that contractors should be following,  like the proper preparation of
wall surfaces  for receiving  tiles. (Tendler 1997:140).
Multi-tasking was an important feature of these grassroots workers' job,  and this made
their services much more attractive to clients. Public health paraprofessionals'  primary
task was preventive care, but they were also authorised to provide some simple curative
care, normally the monopoly of nurses and doctors. Agricultural extension agents were
authorised to provide drought relief and to supervise small construction projects in the
drought relief program, which is normally the job of engineers and supervisors. Instead of
delivering standardized messages about improving farming, these extension workers were
encouraged  to  tackle  various  problems  raised by  farmers,  including  matters  such  as
getting access to an unsympathetic bank.
This seeming jumble of tasks, sometimes involving more brokering than expertise,
cohered together in a client-centric,  problem-solving  approach  to service delivery. It
gave  rise  to  trusting  and  respectful relationships between clients  and  public
servants..  .(Tendler 1997:138).
Lacking the prior extensive land reform of East Asian countries, the state had to tackle
problems of landlord interests and their political connections with local government. This
created problems, for example, in providing drought relief: "the drought relief programs
benefited the region's  large landowners, private contractors and suppliers of relief more
than  those  needing jobs,  food  and  water"  (Tendler  1997:49).  In  the  1987 drought,
agricultural extension workers were used to break the grip of patronage in the distribution
of drought relief. However, sustaining such successes requires much continuing effort,
and at least in the early 1990s the powerful vested interests managed to re-introduce some
clientelism in drought relief.
As Tendler points  out, the Brazilian case shows that the government can be  a strong
moral force in the realm of public  service, and it can use this  force to  get citizens to
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powerful interest  groups. Dedicated workers needed protection  from others,  including
rent-seeking co-workers, superiors and elected officials, and showed much appreciation
for receiving this protection. The state's  government was less likely to respond to the
demands expressed along localized socio-economic divisions and therefore a better ally
of community development projects. All the more so that having services delivered at the
local level and being able to  claim this success as its own was in the state's  political
interest.
As this model was extended to broader areas of development in Brazil,  local political
interference has been kept at bay by the state governments'  insistence that municipal-
level councils for disbursing development funds have at least 80% representation from
end-user  communities  (World  Bank  1997b). Moreover,  if  communities  feel  they  are
unfairly  treated by the municipal councils, they can by-pass them  to  apply for  funds
directly from the state government. Gradually, these councils have gained experience and
an estimated one-third of them have begun to actively monitor other municipal activities
(Coirolo 2000).
Similar but less dramatic examples of successful generation of state-community linkages
for development are to be found in other settings, including in Indonesia and Vietnam. 26
Other  examples  illustrate  the  dangers  of  poorly-designed  efforts  of  this  kind.  For
example, Manor (1999:59) describes how the rush to organise mayoral elections in the
Philippines after the war, before constructing local bureaucratic agencies, resulted in the
mayors  creating  their  own  nepotistic  bureaucracies  and  "creating  a  system  of  local
bossism which  survives to  this day". This was displaced by more centralised bossism
during  Marcos'  regime  (1966-85),  but  has  re-emerged  after  his  fall  in  the  process
commonly known as 'democratization":
The new local government  code has restored  - and indeed  strengthened-  the prerogatives
of municipal  mayors and provincial  governors  over local agencies  and resources  of the
state apparatus.  Given  the manifold  spoils  of these multitudinous  offices,  elections  have
been fiercely  contested,  through  machine  mobilization,  vote-buying,  fraud, manipulation
and violence  (Sidel, 1996).
Here  mechanisms  of monitoring  and accountability were  not  in  place  to  ensure  that
collusion was not used only for private gain but also channelled to the common good.
Reforms towards democratic decentralization, including the involvement of local NGOs
in decision-making at the local level, have not been sufficient to counteract rent-seeking
tendencies of local bosses and entrenchecl  bureaucracies.
The Mexican  PIDER programme, initiated  by the federal government  in  1973, was  a
large investment program for the implementation of small-scale, local projects in some of
the poorest areas in the country. In desc:ribing  how this program operated in the state of
Nayarit, Fox (1992) says that it was initially very successful, with  a dynamic team  of
community orpanizers bringing leaders from several agrarian communities together for
the first time.2'  The team raised awareness among peasants of the losses they sustained
due to tied-markets and rent-seeking bureaucrats. The peasants mobilized successfully to
obtain better access to credit and cheaper fertilisers, by putting pressure on the state's
governor, the  branch manager  of the official agricultural bank,  and  the government's
fertilizer agency. However, in  1976, the presidency changed hands  and reformists lost
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to subvert the movement. The movement had been too short-lived to create a sustainable
force that could stand up alone against the interests of powerful local authorities.
Commonalities in the East Asian and Brazil examples:
This model encourages links between higher echelons of government, local officials and
community  leaders,  to  make  available  to  communities  the  information,  technical,
marketing, credit  and other support they need to  implement their  own programmes of
social and economic development. In South Korea, China, and Taiwan, local leaders and
officials have overlapping roles as simultaneously members of the community served and
of the lowest tier of state administration. In Brazil, grassroots workers are not necessarily
members of the community they serve, but are encouraged to develop close links with
them. Through these dense networks of interaction between the state and communities,
they can collaborate in local development.
In all these cases, and especially in East Asia, the success of the model lay in the fact that
states built on  local institutions,  using local idioms to  construct their "developmental
placentas".  Small-scale  communities  already  have the  dense  network  of  ties  of  co-
operation necessary for this purpose, and the trick is to adapt their particular strengths to
contribute to development goals. In all these cases, these local institutions were not used
for  developmental  purposes  by  previous  governments.  When  the  states  decided  to
accelerate the pace  of development, they were  creative in  tapping into existing  local
institutional structures,  and setting their norms of reciprocity, co-operation and trust to
work  to  achieve  development  goals.  The  catalytic role  of  the  state  was  crucial  for
communities to achieve so much. Even though the East Asian communities have specific
characteristics - low  mobility,  low information costs within the  social group,  strong
kinship  ties  and  communitarian  traditions-  the  Brazilian  example  demonstrates  that
similar  experiences  are possible  outside this  particular  context.  And  the  strength  of
African communities, evidenced by their response to the availability of social funds and
other community-based funds, 28 would also be an asset to develop similar reforms in this
continent.
Changing local agencies'  mode of operation requires overcoming their unwillingness to
accept demands for greater accountability, especially to clients over whom they are often
accustomed to exercising considerable power. Besides, they develop work cultures which
are difficult to shake. Officials can become quite adapted to working environments that
offer  few performance incentives, but  that do offer them the benefits  of status  as the
officials who must be petitioned by their clients. They can become accustomed to  low
work demands and to supplementing inadequate incomes with bribes and payoffs.
To improve local agencies' performance, states orchestrated pressure on them from above
as  well  as  from  the  clients  below  (Figure  1),  to  motivate  them  into  working
collaboratively with communities. The modalities of pressure from above varied widely,
depending on the country's political and administrative resources. South Korea's military
government  used  fiat  to  forcefully  prescribe  bureaucratic  reform,  while  leaving
considerable latitude for local initiative in service delivery. (Even so, officials tried to
evade  greater  accountability,  for  example  by  hiding  the  complaints  box  behind  a
17screen). 29 Post-reform  China  used financial  incentives,  giving local govenments a stake
in the profits of community  enterprises.  In Northeast  Brazil, the state used official job
recognition  to motivate  staff.  Pressure  from below  was orchestrated  in all cases by getting
communities  to expect and demand  better  services.
Figure 1
State-community alliances for development
and improved local public service delivery
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Where the workers were also community members, as in South Korea  and China, the
potential sanctions for non-performance were especially strong as the workers had long-
run interest in good relations with their community. They also gained personally  from
good  service delivery  (e.g. successful irrigation or enterprises), along with  the rest of
their community. Another effective strategy was having their salary and/or job  renewal
dependent  on  community  opinion.  Where  workers  could be  outsiders,  as  in  Brazil,
communities were exhorted to monitor their workers.
Giving grassroots workers the flexibility to do their work properly was important, as also
giving  them  the  scope  to  multi-task  such  that  they  could  meet  client  needs  more
effectively.  For example, if irrigation workers or drought relief staff can also provide
agricultural extension, they are able to derive more status and satisfaction from being able
to help their clients. Getting superiors' official recognition as well as clients' respect for
good performance was an important motivating factor.
A key aspect of grassroots workers' jobs  in all these case studies was that they were
expected not  merely  to  deliver  a  specific  service, but  to  act as  brokers between  the
community and the wider world. Being more in touch with state facilities as well as those
of  the outside world,  they were  expected to  help their  clients  expand their  access to
resources and help them negotiate their way through unfamiliar procedures. This is very
important  to  people  deprived  of  information, and  in  the  absence  of  adequate  state
outreach  they  are  forced  to  depend  for  such  services  on  exploitative  patrons  and
middlemen.
Note that instead of discouraging collusion, this model actually encourages collusion and
channels it into forms which can be productive for the common good.  The success of
the  model  depends  on  productive  collusion  between  community  members  and  their
leaders, and between these leaders and local officials as well as with successive echelons
of the  state administration.  Through  cultivating personal networks,  people can  access
more  resources  to  help  their  communities  prosper.  People  are  expected  to  use
interpersonal  networks  to  enrich  themselves.  The  trick  is  to  ensure  that  the  dense
networks  of local  accountability are  successfully used to  ensure  that while  enriching
themselves,  they  also  enrich  other  members  of  their  community,  as  Pei  (1996)
emphasises in his discussion of China:
The official  cannot make a continued  return for himself  alone from (his administrative
position). Should he try to  do so, his highly-valued  reputation and its interrelated
benefits  will be lost. So it is in the official's own long-term  interests not tojeopardize
them.  Thus,  the  benefits of  village  officials must  be  realized through  profit
maximization  of the village  coalition.  (parentheses  ours).
Generating community demand for grassroots services was an important component of
the  strategy  used  in  all  the  cases  discussed  here.  Through  wide  information
dissemination, people were made aware of what services should be available to them, so
that they would pressurise the staff of their local agencies to provide them. This is crucial
for informing communities of new opportunities and of new rights:
19...  the proclamation  of a right (is) if not automatically  self-fulfilling,  at least the
first step  to any serious  attempt  to secure  that right (Hirschman  1984a:9).
Moreover,  aspirations  were  systematically  raised  to  create  additional  demand  for
services. For  example,  South  Korea  used  organised competition  between  villages  to
generate demand for upgrading village ifacilities,  where if left alone people's  aspirations
would  not  have  risen  so quickly. In  the other settings too,  information  was actively
disseminated on new opportunities in order to motivate clients into demanding and using
services more actively and increase the pace of development.
Adjusting  the roles of  higher  levels ojfgovernment  was  critical to  the  success of  the
enterprise: requiring creative management to alter work habits and perceptions of roles.
Higher levels of bureaucracy were encouraged to shift away from monitoring  and co-
ordinating outreach services, to focus more on the specialised tasks of managing overall
strategy, providing technical support, and regulation and facilitation. Politicians had  to
learn  to  adapt  their  strategies  to  make  greater  use  of  offering  visible  gains  and
empowerment  to  communities.  The  centre's  motivation  may  be  ideological  and
developmental,  but  well-understood  immediate  political  interests  have  also  been  a
powerful driving force to mobilise communities and improve service deliveries. The risk
of  encroachment  of  the  centre  on  local  administrations,  which  would  impede  the
development of strong local administrations (or in cases of decentralised administrations,
strong local governments), is real. Avoidling  local capture requires efficient accountability
mechanisms both to the centre and to the end-users. At the same time, these have to be
done in such a way as to permit and facilitate the development of local administrative and
governmental capacities.
It is important to note that these cases do not bear out some fears commonly associated
with "going directly to communities". Firstly, higher levels of government did not lose
power  as a result of these changes, andl  their new roles offered greater scope for using
professional expertise  than before. Secondly, governments were  not  weakened  by  the
process. On the contrary, these initiatives had substantial political payoffs. For example,
in a municipal election in Brazil, candidates emphasised that they had to support the new
arrangements if they wanted to get elected (Coirolo 2000).
Instead of being undermined, potentially weak governments were strengthened through
this process. Communities were brought into direct contact with the central structure of
the state. Governments were able to inculcate loyalty to the regime during the elaborate
training of community workers in central locations. Politicians in democracies  gained
votes, while developmental authoritarian regimes gained legitimacy. At the same time,
the conditions were strengthened for a plural polity:
... this sort of mobilization  can lead to ... a more vital interaction  between  top and base.
(Hirschman  1984a:8)
Conclusion
We analyse country experiences to examine the conditions required to tap the enormnous
potential for local energies and resources in development in rural settings. At the level of
the community, this requires broadening the distribution of power to avert local capture
20and facilitate collective action. At the level of the state, much success has been achieved
by creating alliances between higher levels of government and communities, to provide
incentives for  local  administration to collaborate  with local  communities and  thereby
improve public service delivery.
The extensive discussion of rural stratification that is reflected in the economic literature
on land reform, inter-linked contracts and the anthropological literature on patron-client
relations has indicated that redistributing land rights can increase equity and growth. We
argue that land redistribution has even more powerful benefits for development through
opening up socio-political hierarchies in the village. Diminished dependence on strong
vertical links with patrons also releases people's  energies for upward mobility: energies
that are otherwise suppressed by fear that patrons will seek to maintain their hegemony
through retribution or by cornering the benefits of any collective action. These changes
can also be effected through  expanding economic opportunities in rural area, and their
ramifications spread to help build a more developmental polity at a national level.
The  literature  on  the  institutional  settings  necessary for  a  developmental  state  can
sometimes suggest that institutional change is a slow process, and that the emergence of
functional institutions is almost a matter of historical accident rather than of deliberate
engineering. Yet both history  and social engineering shape institutional outcomes. We
discuss examples from East Asia and Brazil, of fairly rapid re-engineering of countries'
institutions towards a more developmental direction, and successful re-modelling local
administrations.  We  analyse  the  commonalities in  these  experiences,  as  a  first  step
towards distilling some generalisable lessons from them.
The combination of creating more egalitarian social organisation at the community level
and of local bureaucratic reform enables the creation of powerful coalitions and synergies
for rapid development, with a potentially self-sustaining dynamic. This model has proved
to be very successful in achieving a wide range of outcomes, ranging from health  and
drought relief to  generating agrarian and industrial economic growth. As evidenced by
China and Taiwan, community-level development can help produce not only for local
consumption  but  also  for  a  rich  export  market.  The  Brazilian  case  indicates  that
institutional change is considerably more difficult in highly inegalitarian settings, while
also  illustrating how these obstacles can be gradually overcome by carefully designing
changes which bring grassroots electoral pressure to bear on local government.
These case studies also indicate that states, both authoritarian and democratic, have much
to gain in legitimacy and popularity from initiating these institutional changes. Above all,
these examples  show that with some creative political thinking  it is possible to  effect
rapid change even in poor institutional settings. At the same time, the example of Mexico
shows how fragile such  efforts can be if  political support from  above is prematurely
withdrawn. This paper provides some initial insights into these processes, which deserve
systematic  consideration  if  local  energies  and  resources  for  development  are  to  be
effectively unleashed.
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Breaking  the power  of landowning elites through development programs:  a case study
from  Uttar Pradesh, India: 3 .
The socio-economic  hierarchy  of the village is apparent  even  before  the bus arrives  at the village:
there is one large brick white-washed  mansion, standing out among a sea of mud huts. The
mansion is the home of the talukdar  family,  the erstwhile  large landowner  whose duty it was to
collect land revenues  for the colonial  power.  They lost some of their holdings  when land ceilings
were imposed  in the 1950s,  although  they evaded  much  of this through  fictitious  division.
For the next couple of decades,  the talukdars  consolidated  their relationships  with the new power
structures  of the state. In a typical  pattern of diversifying  family networks,  the father arranged  for
one son to be in the police service, while another  managed  the land. They continued to be the
critical source of credit and employment for the villagers, and their overwhelming social
superiority was acknowledged  by the villagers as they prefaced every interaction with the
greeting  "Touching  your feet, Lord..."
For this family, well-educated  and well-connected,  it was easy to divert development  funds to
their own benefit and the other villagers would typically not even come to  know of  the
entitlements  of which they were being deprived.  Even if they did come to know of it, they could
hardly  protest  about it when the talukdars  had guns and were known  to rape and maim at will.
In the mid-1970s, information  on tubewells reached some middle-level  peasants, who pooled
resources to sink a tubewell to irrigate their contiguous  plots. Eager to maximise  their profits,
they began to  sow cash crops and raised the wages they offered agricultural labour. The
talukdar's son responded by striding around at the weekly market with a gun slung over his
shoulder, threatening  that he would shoot anyone  who offered labourers  more than the "going
rate". This temporarily  thwarted  the middle peasants'  efforts.
However, new opportunities  offered  by tubewells  and the opening  of a milk-collection  center in
the village made it increasingly  difficult for the  talukdars to retain their position in the village
society and economy. Over time, the middle-level  peasants were successful in raising their
incomes,  and offered  a greater multiplicity  of sources  of employment  and credit for the poor. The
bi-polar  polity of the village  changed  into one with a broader  distribution  of power.
In a study of another  Uttar Pradesh  village,  Dreze  et al (1998)  noted similar tensions between  the
same  middle peasant  group and the ex-talukdars.  There,  the talukdars  had tried methods  such as
arson  and election-rigging  to maintain  their power,  but the middle peasants' determined  use of the
new agrarian opportunities was eventually successful in  challenging the hegemony of the
talukdars.  By the 1990s,  the middle peasants  had become prosperous  and educated,  and formed a
serious  challenge  to the talukdars  in the village  polity.
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The ladder out of poverty for a low-caste labourer household in Haryana, India 32
Emarti's  father-in-law  was  displaced  from  his  patron-client  ties  when  his  patrons'
families grew large enough to manage most of their own labour needs. For some years
after  her  marriage,  her husband  scraped together  a  minimal  living  for them  and  his
brother's  widow, but then became too weak to work. The two women worked long hours
at whatever tasks they could find: cutting the harvest; cleaning seed corn before sowing;
making  ropes;  spinning;  some  daily wage  labour. They  had  one  child  each,  whom
Emarti's  husband minded during the day.
As they gained confidence, the two women took in a buffalo calf to "sharecrop"  for a
landowning family. The arrangement is that the "sharecropper" tends and feeds the calf
until it begins to give milk, whereupon they receive half the market value of the grown
buffalo. They fed the calf with green weeds collected from landowners'  standing crops,
which is permitted because it gives the fields a free weeding. When the buffalo matured,
they took their share of the proceeds in cash.
Both their  sons, Kirshan  and Puran, went  to  the village school  and when  they were
around sixteen they started working as casual labourers. Kirshan was an enterprising and
reliable  worker,  and  succeeded  in  leasing  a plot  of  land on  which  he  grew labour-
intensive vegetables. He put in the labour and a third of the inputs, and kept a third of the
value of the crop. By the standards of his household, this was a lucrative arrangement,
and their mothers'  earnings from the buffalo made it possible to take the contract. With
these earnings, Puran bought a sewing machine and began work as a village tailor.
Emboldened by their growing savings, the mothers bought out the landowner's  share of
the next buffalo calf. Taking advantage of a state cattle-breeding programme, they had
for a nominal fee had the buffalo inseminated with high-quality semen to raise its milk
yield. Now the proud possessors of a lactating buffalo, they fed it with cottonseeds and
mustard cakes to increase the milkfat, and processed it into clarified butter for sale. By
this time, the household was well out of the days of daily struggle to make ends meet.
Over time, Kirshan was able to obtain a salaried job as a security guard in a town, and
sent regular remittances  home. The growing sense of domestic  prosperity was finally
sealed when the mothers felt able to retire from hard labour while they were still able-
bodied.
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26 Ranis and Stewart (1994), Evans (1996).
27 Mexican agrarian reform communities, the ejidos, are institutions to which the government cedes land
uses rights. They are corporatist institutions , which take decisions through democratic mass membership
assemblies, but government officials supervise and often intervene in internal elections. Ejidos can from
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28 World Bank 2000c.
29 Wade  1997
30 See  Baumol  (1990).
31 Source:  Vinod  Jairath  and  Monica  Das Gupta,  fieldnotes  from  Hardoi  district.
32 Source: Monica Das Gupta fieldnotes from a village in Haryana, India
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